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Abstract 
 
 
The nine refereed publications on which this submission is based have explored 
legislative changes to discrimination law ahead of and via the Equality Act 2010.  Some 
of the submitted publications take a broad approach whereas others focus on specific 
issues or statutory provisions.  Together they form a body of work the central aim of 
which, and which constitutes the papers’ primary contribution to knowledge, is to 
provide an analysis of a number of aspects of the Equality Act 2010.  This commentary 
displays this analysis within the contexts of the Equality Act’s predecessor legislation, 
its drafting and passage through Parliament and the scope of judicial interpretation.  
The significance of the papers and their individual contributions to knowledge are 
highlighted in the introduction and in the discussion of the papers under those three 
contextual sub-themes (the predecessor legislation, drafting and passage through 
Parliament and judicial interpretation).  This thematic approach demonstrates the 
coherency of the submitted publications and allows common elements to be 
discussed. 
 
The submitted publications show that it is clear that the Equality Act 2010 has in areas 
harmonised and arguably simplified the preceding law, but they also show that the 
Equality Act 2010 has introduced its own complications which to some extent can be 
attributable to the parliamentary scrutiny it received.  The papers and the 
commentary provide support for changes which have occurred and also suggest 
others.  The citations of the papers and a representation of national and international 
use of the papers are included in an appendix which is drawn on in the commentary.  
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The commentary 
---- 
 
Introduction and outline of research 
 
 
The Basis of the Submission  
 
This submission is based on publications which have explored legislative changes to 
discrimination law ahead of and via the Equality Act 2010.  It comprises: nine 
publications (eight of which have already appeared in reputable academic journals 
with a further article forthcoming in 2016); this commentary which seeks to place the 
selected publications in context; and five appendices. 
 
The papers selected for inclusion in this submission: (1) have made an original 
contribution to knowledge; (2) make a potential contribution to future policy; and (3) 
despite being based primarily on British law,1 have some international as well as 
national relevance. 
 
My central aim, and the papers’ primary contribution to knowledge, was to provide an 
analysis of a number of aspects of the Equality Act 2010 which can be viewed within 
the contexts of its predecessor legislation, its drafting and passage through Parliament 
and the scope of judicial interpretation (and, following this introduction, the body of 
the narrative will discuss the papers under those contextual headings).  Among the 
submitted publications are the sole journal articles cited in Westlaw’s ‘Legislation 
Analysis – Journal Articles’ for section 14 and for section 40 of the Equality Act 2010 as 
                                                     
1
 British law is referred to here, rather than UK law or the law of England and Wales, as the Equality Act 
2010 and its predecessors form (with very limited exception) part of the law of England and Wales and 
Scotland whereas Northern Irish anti-discrimination law is a discrete body of law. 
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well as a number of relatively highly accessed articles (which is, to some extent, one 
indicator of a contribution to knowledge).   In challenging certain provisions and 
others’ assertions the selection can be seen to make a potential contribution to future 
(or, indeed, support contemporary) policy.  The international scope of a number of 
journals – and the applicability of principles – has been reflected by overseas use of 
some of the pieces (as will be mentioned further below in the narrative and in 
Appendix 2). 
 
My Research Background 
 
My research has predominantly been undertaken adopting what could be described 
as a doctrinal, black-letter approach although there are elements of comparative and 
socio-legal methodologies (both in my research generally and, more specifically, in the 
papers selected for this submission).  This is partly due to my academic background (I 
have a PgDL/CPE – my undergraduate degree was primarily in accounting – which 
limited exposure to alternative methodologies), circumstance and the nature of the 
subject matter.  However, I have, outside of the submitted publications, undertaken 
more quantitative and historical research.2    
 
Publications Submitted 
 
i) A Chronological List 
 
The submitted publications are noted in chronological order below.  That they have 
been published (or accepted for publication) in reputable, peer-reviewed journals is 
an indication of their originality and value but a brief indication of their particular 
contribution is also noted here.     
 
                                                     
2
 E.g. J Hand, ‘The compensation culture: cliché or cause for concern?’ (2010) 37(4) JoLS 569-591; J 
Hand, ‘House of Lords reform: many anniversaries and a false dichotomy?’ (2009) WebJCLI (4).  (A long-
term health condition hinders more active, empirical research.) 
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1.  Hand, J.  (2008) ‘A Decade of Change in British Discrimination Law: Positive Steps 
Forward?’  34(3) Commonwealth Law Bulletin  595-605 
 
Originality / value – Ahead of the then forthcoming Equality Act, this article reviewed 
developments in the preceding decade and considered the scope for positive measures 
within British anti‐discrimination law.  It was thought to be of ‘great interest to [CLB] 
readers, not least because it deals with an area of the law that a number of 
Commonwealth countries are still in the process of developing’.3 
 
2.  Hand, J.  (2011) ‘Combined Discrimination - section 14 of the Equality Act 2010: a 
partial and redundant provision?  [2011] Public Law 482-490 
 
Originality / value – An early entrant on the EHRC Equality Act 2010 Reading List, this 
piece is the only article mentioned on Westlaw for section 14 of the Equality Act 2010.  
It considers, using practical examples, how pre-existing law might be interpreted to 
provide alternative methods of protecting those suffering combined discrimination and 
how such an approach would render s.14 redundant as well as reflecting on the 
shortcomings and inconsistencies of the provision ahead of the Coalition’s 
announcement that it would not be brought into force. 
 
3.  Hand, J. , Davis, B. & Feast P.  (2012) ‘Unification, simplification, amplification? An 
analysis of aspects of the British Equality Act 2010’ 38(3) Commonwealth Law Bulletin  
509-528 
 
Originality / value – An early analysis of the new Act.  It notes that despite its long 
gestation period, the Bill suffered from a lack of parliamentary scrutiny.  As well as 
setting the Act in context it also discusses how far it has met its aims of unifying, 
simplifying and (to a limited extent) strengthening anti-discrimination law.  It has been 
cited in a submission to a review of discrimination law in Hong Kong. 
 
                                                     
3
 Email from Aldo Zammit-Borda to James Hand (20 March 2008). 
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4.  Hand, J.  (2012) ‘The curious case of marriage/civil partnership discrimination in 
Britain’ 12(3) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 166-178 
 
Originality / value – Peer reviewer’s comments were prefaced by ‘I think it is an 
interesting article on an area that is little researched or written about’.  This article 
considers developments that could mean that marriage/civil partnership 
discrimination could have a much wider scope rather than, as some would have it, 
being relegated to being a quaint relic of the past. 
 
5.  Hand, J.  (2013) ‘Employer’s Liability for Third-Party Harassment: An ‘Unworkable’ 
and Superfluous Provision?’ 42(1) Industrial Law Journal 75-84 
 
Originality / value – This piece is the only article mentioned on Westlaw for section 40 
of the Equality Act 2010.  It considers the ‘unworkability’ of the provision and whether 
it was actually necessary.  In the end it was published eight months before the repeal 
of the section took effect. 
 
6.  Hand, J., Davis, B. & Barker, C.  (2015) ‘The British Equality Act 2010 and the 
foundations of legal knowledge’ 41(1) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 3–28  
 
Originality / value – This piece hit 200 views within 5 months of publication on the 
publisher’s site.  It combines further analysis of the Equality Act with legal education 
(adopting the seven foundations as a prism through which to examine the Act). 
 
7.  Hand, J.  (2015) ‘Outside the Equality Act: Non-standard protection from 
discrimination in British law’ 15(4) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 
205-221 
 
Originality / value – In light of the government’s decision following Redfearn v UK  
[2012] ECHR 1878 this article considers the protection afforded to membership of 
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groups among other atypical protections and considers the effect of expanding the 
Equality Act as an alternative having identified a lacuna in the government’s response.   
 
8.  Hand, J.  (2016?) ‘Discrimination Law and the Ebb and Flow of Indirect Effect in 
Britain’ Liverpool Law Review (forthcoming) 
 
Originality / value - Strained judicial interpretation of British discrimination law is not 
new - some of the leading House of Lords cases on the doctrine of Indirect Effect have 
concerned discrimination law – and this has continued into the Equality Act era, 
notably regarding pregnancy/maternity and the incompletely drafted victimisation 
provisions.  It has been accepted as making an original contribution situated in the 
critical debate by the editor (and described as interesting and engaging by peer 
reviewers) and I understand it is forthcoming in 2016. 
 
9.  Feast, P. and Hand, J. (2015) ‘Enigmas of the Equality Act – “Three Uneasy Pieces”’, 
Cogent Social Sciences 1: 1123085 (15 Dec 2015) 
 
Originality / value – This most recently published piece again looks at the 
pregnancy/maternity and victimisation provisions – along with gender reassignment – 
but is written for a wider market, the social science community and beyond, and brings 
those topics up to date (at the time of writing).   
 
Most of the research is sole-authored.  I was the lead author on the three co-authored 
pieces and my contribution to them was substantial and significant (see Appendix 3). 
 
 
ii) Indications of Quality 
 
Further details appear in the appendices but a short summary is provided here. 
 
1.  Citations 
 
6 
 
Citations can be an indicator of the quality and relevance of articles but their use as a 
metric must be used with caution, not least as there will have been little opportunity 
for recent publications to be cited.  A full list (to the extent of my knowledge) is 
provided at Appendix 2 but, in summary, citations include a number of textbooks, at 
least a couple of theses and journals, and a consultation submission by Amnesty 
International (HK).  (Google Scholar has not been used as it is not an authoritative 
measure of citations (e.g. for my most cited article – not within this submission – a 
number of citations are omitted by Google Scholar even from journals in the same 
publishing house.) 
 
2.  Research excellence submissions 
 
Consideration regarding submission to RAE/REF is another indicator of quality used in 
PhD by publication submissions.  Some publications may have gone through further 
external peer review as part of the process.  None of the publications fell in the 
former RAE time period and so they have only been eligible for one REF cycle at most; 
publications 6, 7, 8 and 9 post-date the REF 2014 census date.  For REF 2014, 
publication 3 was included along with another refereed journal article which has not 
been included in this submission (as I am 0.5FTE only two were submitted).4   
 
3.  ‘Quality’ of Journals 
 
Although not a proxy used within the REF, journal rankings provide an indication of 
the quality of a paper (although caveats clearly apply).  Within Portsmouth Business 
School, a combination of the ABS and ARC ERA ranking lists are used along with 
individual internal and/or external review.  The journals in which the submitted 
publications appear are ranked as follows: 
 
                                                     
4
 To UoA 22 (Social Work and Social Policy) as there was ultimately no UoA 20 (Law) submission by the 
University. 
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ARC ERA A* – Public Law (ABS n/a)  (Publication 2) 
 
ARC ERA A – Industrial Law Journal (ABS 3*)  (Publication 5) 
 
ARC ERA B – International Journal of Discrimination and the Law (ABS n/a)  
(publications 4 & 7) 
 
ARC ERA C – Liverpool Law Review  (Publication 8) 
 
(The Commonwealth Law Bulletin (Publications 1, 3 & 6) does not appear in either list 
but Publication 3 was submitted to REF and Publication 1 was externally peer-
reviewed and rated as 2*/3* in the early REF planning; Cogent Social Sciences 
(Publication 9) does not appear in either list as it was founded in 2015).  
 
4.  Hits/Downloads 
 
Different publishers make different information available but use can also be an 
indicator of quality although such figures should again be approached with caution.  
Publications 4, 5 and 7 have appeared in the most read lists of certain months (see 
Appendix 2; cumulative figures are not publicly available).  Taylor & Francis figures 
show that Publication 1 has been viewed over 150 times, Publication 3 has been 
viewed 877 times (making it the fourth most read article in the journal since records 
began in 2011) and Publication 6 has already been read 370 times.  This is in addition 
to, sometimes very substantial, accesses through academia.edu (see further Appendix 
2). 
 
A general reflection on the research methodologies used  
 
For much of what could be termed traditional legal scholarship, research theories and 
methods may not be as explicit as they may be in other areas.  As Cownie notes, 
 
8 
doctrinal law ‘is often portrayed as essentially uncritical’5 – citing Adams and 
Brownsword’s view that ‘Black-letterism concentrates on the law as it is, not as it 
ought to be, nor why it came to be as it is’.6  This, however, seems to be too restrictive 
or too negative a view.  The Pearce Committee, by contrast, included within its 
definition of doctrinal research that it ‘explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, 
predicts future developments.’7  On the former definition, much of my research 
arguably may not fall to be called black-letter (or doctrinal) as it often does consider 
how the law came to be (see, e.g., publications 1, 2, 3) and what it ought to be (see, 
perhaps most particularly, publications 4, 5, 8) but it could, however, be seen to more 
closely meet the Pearce definition.  Elements of socio-legal work may be discerned in 
the submitted publications, perhaps most noticeably in Publication 4 on marriage/civil 
partnership discrimination but also in a number of others when considering, for 
example, policy justifications,8 but socio-legal purists may decry applying the epithet 
more broadly due to the lack of broader contextual and behavioural study.9  Indeed, 
to cite Cownie again, ‘the line between legal academics adopting a doctrinal 
perspective and those adopting a socio-legal perspective is not always clear’ the two 
concepts being treated fluidly in discourse.10  There is a comparative element to some 
of the pieces (particularly Publication 7) but the corpus could not be described as a 
comparative work.   I could, perhaps, have sought to undertake, for example, such 
approaches as a feminist analysis or one which required a more fundamental 
challenging of the source of the law.  However, throughout the genesis of the 
individual pieces, a traditional constrained analysis of the particular subject matter 
                                                     
5
 F Cownie, Legal Academics Culture and Identities (Hart Publishing 2004) 69. 
6
 J N Adams and R Brownsword Understanding Law (Sweet & Maxwell 1999) 29. 
7
 D Pearce, E Campbell and D Harding (‘Pearce Committee’), Australian Law Schools: A Discipline 
Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1987) cited in T Hutchinson, Researching  and Writing in Law (Reuters Thomson, 3rd ed, 2010) 
7 which in turn is cited in N J Duncan and T Hutchinson, ‘Defining and describing what we do: Doctrinal 
legal research’ (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 83-119, 101. 
8
 Indeed, the REF Main Panel C Overview Report states for Law ‘the field of legal studies as a whole is 
increasingly influenced by socio-legal research methods and techniques’ Research Excellence  
Framework 2014: Overview report by Main Panel C and Sub-panels 16 to 26, HEfCE, p.71. 
9
 Context and behavioural studies being identified as important aspects of true socio-legal work (see, 
e.g., R Cotterrell Law 's Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (Clarendon Press 1995) 
296-298 and D Feenan, ‘Editorial: Socio-legal studies and the humanities’ (2009) 5(3) Int. J.L.C 235, 235-
237. 
10
 F Cownie, Legal Academics Culture and Identities (Hart Publishing 2004) 56. 
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seemed to lend itself well to this topic.  Furthermore, it also adds to the coherence of 
this collection of submitted publications which concentrates on assessing the law 
against its stated aims rather than conducting a broader analysis of, for example, the 
source or morality of the law. 
 
General Framework 
 
In this PhD by publication, the submitted publications and the commentary about 
them, as is noted above, may be said to fall primarily at the doctrinal/positivist end of 
the spectrum.  Accordingly, much of the analysis looks at how the law operates within 
the current framework, including whether changes meet their stated aim.   
 
As formal equality is the dominant model, as explained in the commentary, that 
model primarily informs the analysis.  That is not to say, however, that substantive 
equality is ignored (as, indeed, it features in the underpinning law) but rather that 
radical solutions which promote concepts of substantive equality and diverge from the 
accepted norm were not a driving force for the individual submitted publications and 
the commentary follows suit.  Aristotelian equality, where likes should be treated 
alike, allows for positive measures for disabled people as they are in an unalike 
situation (as noted in e.g. Archibald v Fife Council11).  The restrictive approach of 
national and European law allows positive measures to be taken to redress historic 
disadvantage and limited elements of positive discrimination (in either tie-break 
situations judged individually, taking advantage of a limited derogation, or in areas 
where discrimination is not outlawed so positive discrimination does not contravene 
the law).12  The positivistic, doctrinal approach undertaken does not challenge the 
fundamental moral outlook of the law.13  Instead it seeks to address a more practical, 
achievable outcome with the primary concern of many of these papers – and this 
                                                     
11
 [2004] IRLR 651 
12
 This is more fully discussed in the commentary and submitted publications (notably Publications 1 
and 3) but examples included Equality Act 2010 s.158 (positive measures), s.159 (tie-break) and s.104(7) 
(allowing women-only shortlists for political candidature at relevant election). 
13
 E.g. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3
rd
 ed., 2011), p. 163.  For a discussion in case law, see e.g. AG 
Sharpston’s opinion in Birgit Bartsch v Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge GmbH (Case 
C‑427/06) [2008] ECR I-7245, paras 42-46. 
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commentary – being how the Equality Act 2010 (and the interpretation of it) could 
better meet its aims.  It could be said that the focus is on anti-discrimination law 
rather than broader equality (although that nonetheless features in the pieces). 
 
An outline of the rest of the commentary 
 
The commentary aims to present how the submitted publications form a coherent and 
systematic study of aspects of the Equality Act 2010.  All the articles relate, one way or 
another, to the Act and interrelate with each other and the display of ‘independent 
thought’, critical analysis and contribution to knowledge embodied in the work takes 
the form of a discussion of them in the context of three sub-themes (as well as the 
summary above and supported by the appendices below).  The sub-themes, as 
mentioned above, are the contexts of i) the Equality Act 2010’s predecessor 
legislation, ii) its drafting and passage through Parliament and iii) the scope of judicial 
interpretation (the overarching theme of the submitted publications being British anti-
discrimination law, with particular reference to the Equality Act 2010).  It is the nature 
of the pieces that they do not fall simply within one of those sub-themes – indeed 
most fall to varying extents within all – and so many of the submitted publications are 
subject to consideration under each theme (but to varying extents).  This thematic 
approach demonstrates the coherency of the submitted publications and allows 
common elements to be discussed.  The submitted publications do not form a linear 
patchwork of discrete groups of articles on a broad theme that need to be linked; 
instead they examine a common subject from different angles allowing a broader 
picture to be presented.  
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The three sub-themes 
 
 
Predecessor Legislation 
 
The Equality Act 2010 was technically not a consolidating act14 but one which sought 
to unify (though not fully), simplify (purportedly) and, to a limited extent, strengthen 
British anti-discrimination law.  As can be seen from the selected publications, it is a 
creature of its circumstances including its predecessors.  Publications 1 – 9 all, to 
varying extents, examine the recent historical context, including the limits, 
idiosyncrasies and effect of the earlier legislation, and the possibilities of 
improvement to the regulatory framework. 
 
As noted in the selected publications, the dominant underlying model in British 
discrimination law is that of formal equality with elements of substantive equality (in 
its varied definitions).  While formal equality takes what may be described as an 
Aristotelian approach requiring equality of treatment, substantive equality 
encompasses equality of opportunity (including, as it were, a levelling of the playing 
field pre-match) and equality of ends (including amending the result).  The dominance 
of that founding principle, that likes should be treated alike, as well as the piecemeal 
approach to the law left unresolved questions surrounding the scope of positive 
action and hierarchies of protection.   Publication 1 (A Decade of Change in British 
Discrimination Law: Positive Steps Forward?) foreshadowed the 2010 Act and 
examined positive, as contrasted with prohibitive, provisions.  It provides an overview 
of the approach to discrimination protection in British law (which was and is primarily 
formal rather than substantive) and, more particularly, examines the positive action 
provisions of the predecessor (and European) legislation in detail, ahead of the 
tentative and prospective increase in substantive equality and notes the comparative 
lack of development in the years before the (then awaited) Act.  The subsequent 
                                                     
14
 Jessemey v Rowstock Ltd & Anor [2014] EWCA Civ 185, [31]; Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey [2013] IRLR 
439, EAT, [31], Calmac Ferries Ltd v Wallace & Anor [2014] ICR 453, EAT, [4]. 
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publications examine the impact of the Equality Act 2010, examining how the 
framework functions both in general and, with many of the publications, by focussing 
on specific issues.  Thus Publication 3 provides a broad sweep of the Act, and focuses 
on particular changes from the predecessor legislation such as the expanded scope of 
positive action, whereas such pieces as publications 2, 4, 7 take a narrower focus 
within broader topics such as pre-existing hierarchies of protection and in the case of 
Publication 2 substantive equality.15  This is discussed below.  The submitted 
publications do not set out to challenge the existing models (or demand a shift to 
achieve greater aims) but seek to analyse how the law works within what may be 
considered to be the current framework. 
 
Publication 3 (Unification, simplification, amplification? An analysis of aspects of the 
British Equality Act 2010) analyses aspects of the Equality Act 2010, questioning the 
extent of the unification, simplification and intentionally limited amplification of the 
predecessor legislation’s protection from discrimination in British law.  While there 
was very little change in, for example, the classification of protected characteristics or 
the definitions of direct and indirect discrimination (beyond limited harmonisation), 
there was significant movement in positive action, along the lines adopted by the 
European Court of Justice as examined in Publication 1.  British law had lagged behind 
European law in allowing the provision of specific ‘measures’ or ‘advantages’ to 
combat under-representation of particular groups such as allowing tie-break 
provisions allowing women to be appointed over equally qualified men.  The Equality 
Act 2010 saw British law take advantage of that discretion through the introduction of 
section 159.  As the European jurisprudence discussed in the articles makes clear, 
there cannot be an arbitrary preference for women, such as to fill quotas, but there 
can be a tie-break preference; however, where EU law does not apply, blatant positive 
discrimination can take place as with the provision in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, 
and subsequently the Equality Act 2010, allowing for all-women shortlists for electoral 
                                                     
15
 E.g. in Publication 2 I contest the value of the combined discrimination provision, which was limited 
to direct discrimination (formal equality), while fully supporting the validity of intersectional concerns 
when it comes to positive action (which is an aspect of substantive equality).   
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candidates.16  As stated in the conclusion to Publication 3, the Equality Act 2010 ‘can 
hardly be said to have harmonised the law when the number of relevant protected 
characteristics frequently varies, ranging as it does from nine down to four (as well as 
the occasional characteristic specific provision)’; and as for simplification ‘introducing 
more algebraic formulations and altering the structure by tucking more commonly 
used provisions after lesser ones and relocating the exceptions from following the rule 
into a distant schedule’17 as well as making superficial changes to language does little 
to meet the aim.  In coming to such a conclusion, close attention to the predecessor 
legislation is a necessity. 
 
Publication 4 (The curious case of marriage/civil partnership discrimination in Britain) 
is a rare example of an article that considers, let alone focusses, on marriage/civil 
partnership discrimination.  Marriage discrimination was one of the first 
characteristics to be protected in modern (i.e. post 1970) British discrimination law 
and the earlier legislation – and the failure of the new legislation ‘to simplify the law 
through real harmonisation bringing marriage and civil partnership (or even the 
broader family status) into the fold’18 – is examined.  Analysing what at the time was 
very recent case law (as well as older cases) and the legislative history of the provision 
the article contributes to the broader discussion of hierarchies of protection within 
discrimination law by the likes of Bell & Waddington (2003), Howard (2007) and 
Vickers (2010)19 by focussing on what can be seen to be the little-scrutinised ‘runt of 
the litter’20 within the purported hierarchies. 
                                                     
16
 By contrast, other protected characteristics are only afforded the lesser positive action, rather than 
the permitted positive discrimination: while acting in accordance with ‘selection arrangements’ for 
electoral candidates does not contravene the prohibition of discrimination, only sex is exempted from 
the statement in s.104(6) of the Equality Act 2010 that ‘Selection arrangements do not include short-
listing only such persons as have a particular protected characteristic’ (s.104(7) Equality Act 2010). 
17
 J Hand, B Davis & P Feast, ‘Unification, simplification, amplification? An analysis of aspects of the 
British Equality Act 2010’ (2012) 38(3) Commonwealth Law Bulletin  509-528, 528. 
18
 J Hand, ‘The curious case of marriage/civil partnership discrimination in Britain’ (2012) 12(3) 
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 166-178, 173. 
19
 M Bell and L Waddington, ‘Reflecting on inequalities in European equality law’ [2003] European Law 
Review 349–369; E Howard, ‘The case for a considered hierarchy of discrimination grounds in EU law’ 
(2007) 13 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 445–470; L Vickers, ‘Religious 
discrimination in the workplace: an emerging hierarchy?’ (2010) 12 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 280–303. 
20
 J Hand, ‘The curious case of marriage/civil partnership discrimination in Britain’ (2012) 12(3) 
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 166-178, 167. 
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The primary prior provision featured in Publication 5 (Employer’s Liability for Third-
Party Harassment: An ‘Unworkable’ and Superfluous Provision?)is the 2008 
amendment to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 which introduced the statutory 
concept of third-party harassment (although slightly older, general provisions on 
harassment are also examined) in this early analysis of the ‘superfluous’, ‘unworkable’ 
and as it turned out short-lived third party harassment provision within the Equality 
Act 2010 (which is as noted above the only article cited on Westlaw for the provision).  
The examination of the prior law is fundamental to the analysis which shows that the 
new provision was not only unwieldy, if not ‘unworkable’,21 but also superfluous.  
Third party liability was introduced as a discrete provision following a judicial review 
that required other implemented changes one of which – adopting an associative 
(‘related to’) rather than a causative (‘on grounds of’) approach – had the effect of 
further rendering such a provision unnecessary.  Furthermore, other changes to 
statutes which had occurred after the House of Lords consideration of third party 
harassment in 200322 meant that the new provision – which required a course of 
conduct – sat alongside existing protection, which did not, rendering it superfluous.  
This is further considered under the other two sub-themes. 
 
Publications 7 (on protection outside the Act), 8 (on judicial interpretation) and 9 (on 
three enigmas of the Equality Act) span across the pre-Equality Act and Equality Act 
periods, with Publication 8 tracing the apparent ebbing and flowing of indirect effect 
in the British courts with regard to discrimination law and as such it (along with 
Publication 9) falls more appropriately to be considered further below.  Publication 7 
deals not so much with predecessor legislation as with extant or subsequent 
provisions which remain outside the ‘single’ Equality Act.  Its value lies in showing the 
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diversity of protections and in looking at the Equality Act 2010 through what it is not 
and in how it may evolve.  The government’s decision to maintain the closed-list 
approach and its eschewing of adding further characteristics to the list means that 
consideration of the article under the next sub-theme – passage through parliament – 
is necessarily limited, but one particular lacuna identified in the article will be 
considered there. 
 
While much of the consideration of previous law is contextual, it does provide 
background or substantive material for critical analysis throughout the selected 
publications and for novel approaches such as that in Publication 6 (analysing the Act 
through the seven foundations of legal knowledge and vice versa). 
 
 
Drafting and Passage through Parliament 
 
Whether the innovatory, or indeed merely unificatory, elements of the Equality Act 
2010 merged in a form that was fully considered comprises a further theme of my 
work.  A major argument made was that inadequate legislative scrutiny led to a 
number of problematic provisions.   
 
The submitted publications, to varying extents, thus comment on the Bill’s passage 
through Parliament and often analyse the potential effect of the apparent lack of 
scrutiny.  As stated in Publication 6, while Hepple  
 
asserts that the Act ‘was the product of intense and detailed scrutiny in 
Parliament over a period of nearly a year’, with the House of Commons Public 
Bill committee taking 38 hours and the Commons Report stage a further 5½ 
hours,23 parliamentarians in both chambers lamented the lack of time available 
for proper scrutiny with one noting that ‘the Leader of the House will go down 
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in history as having organized things in such a way that more amendments and 
new clauses than ever before have fallen without scrutiny in this place.’24 
 
No-one can deny that the Bill was a long time coming25 nor that time was spent on the 
Bill; whether sufficient time was spent, however, is a different matter.  Years of 
general – and, indeed, specific debate – does not in itself necessarily filter in to the 
quality of the legislation tabled before the House, time spent on one area does not 
mitigate lack of consideration elsewhere and provisions introduced late on in the 
passage of the Bill, perhaps inevitably, may be subject to less consideration. 
 
Publication 2 (Combined Discrimination - section 14 of the Equality Act 2010: a partial 
and redundant provision?) analyses one example of a provision introduced ‘late in the 
day’ (to quote the then Solicitor-General),26 that of combined discrimination.  
Combined discrimination occurs when the less favourable treatment (or in theory 
disparate impact or harassment) is related to two (or, in theory, more than one) 
protected characteristic.  It is closely related to intersectionality (the concept that 
people do not fall ‘along a single categorical axis’ to quote Crenshaw in her seminal 
work).27  Section 14 was intended to fill part – and only part – of the perceived gap in 
protection when someone was treated, for example, less favourably because they 
were a Muslim man (as opposed to a Muslim woman or a non-Muslim man).  It did 
not extend to indirect discrimination or harassment, nor cover the protected 
characteristics of pregnancy/maternity and marriage/civil partnership, nor extend to 
circumstances where more than two protected characteristics were involved.  The 
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publication analyses the responses to the consultation on introducing the provision 
and notes that, following its introduction late on in Committee, there was ‘no debate 
on the point in the Commons during the report stage or at Third Reading and only 
brief mentions during Second Reading in the House of Lords’.28  It posits that greater 
parliamentary  scrutiny may have helped resolve  
 
inconsistencies in s.14, with greater attention paid to the arguments put 
forward by, among others, the CAB and a greater testing of the Government's 
assertion that expansion of the dual discrimination provision would be 
unnecessarily complex (and, indeed, that their partial provision did not create 
its own complexities),29   
 
before going on both to challenge the thinking behind the provision and to suggest a 
simpler alternative (as outlined in the next paragraph and under the interpretation 
sub-theme).   
 
While the issue of intersectionality is an important one when it comes to positive 
action,30 Publication 2 challenges the examples given (by ministers, consultees and 
within the explanatory notes)  in support of the introduction of a prohibitory provision 
and shows how the existing law regarding comparisons – both statute and case law – 
can be interpreted to provide a more comprehensive and coherent system of 
protection than that partially afforded by the provision.  In doing so, it challenges the 
view that the controversial case of Bahl v Law Society31 prevents claims by those who 
are discriminated against on two grounds and shows how it can be used to support 
such claims without requiring a specific definition (as discussed under the 
interpretation sub-theme).  Section 14 as enacted could thus be seen to be both 
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partial and redundant.  While this appears to be a novel, contrarian contention – given 
the views of ministers, consultees and writers such as Moon and McColgan32 – further 
debate during the passage of the Bill could have allowed such views to emerge.33 
 
Publications 3 and 6 take a broader overview of the Act and include, to varying 
extents, the passage of the Bill within that overview; in the case of Publication 6 (on 
the seven foundations of legal knowledge and the Equality Act 2010) the passage of 
the Bill forms the focus of part of the section on the public law foundation (with 
regard to the lack of scrutiny detailed in the quote excerpted above as well as 
detailing early amendments to the Act and peculiarities which may have derived from 
the lack of parliamentary scrutiny)34 and is also noted in the section on land or 
property law (with regard to the undue haste and undebated nature of the – currently 
unimplemented – abolition of the presumption of advancement).35 
 
The consideration of legislative scrutiny in Publication 3 (Unification, simplification, 
amplification? An analysis of aspects of the British Equality Act 2010) includes a 
passage on the peculiarities of the definition and application of harassment which has 
been cited by Amnesty International Hong Kong in their submission to the 
Discrimination Law Review conducted by the Equal Opportunities Commission of Hong 
Kong.  The Equality Act defines discrimination and provides for seven relevant 
protected characteristics and then in unlawful act provisions excludes some of those 
protected characteristics from applying in that particular area but allows potential 
redress by exempting those areas from the exclusion of harassment from constituting 
a detriment and thus allowing potential direct discrimination claims instead.  
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Following such a paraphrasing of the point and a four line quote, the submission 
states, ‘It is to be noted that while the [Hong Kong]EOC itself has raised simplification 
and preferable consolidation’ and ‘harmonization’ as the principles of this review, 
such curious  and possibly confusing drafting in the UK experience should be avoided 
in Hong Kong’.36 
 
Analysis of the passage through Parliament in Publication 4 (the piece on 
marriage/civil partnership discrimination) focuses on the debate concerning the 
protected characteristic rather than the lack of time.  This little litigated and highly 
limited provision was threatened with abolition during the genesis of the Act with the 
Government opting to retain it ‘just in case’ but not to standardise the protection.  
Thus it remains uni-directional (protecting married/civil partner-ed people only and 
not the converse, i.e. single people) and it is excluded from harassment, the non-
implemented dual discrimination provision and all but one of the Parts setting out the 
prohibited acts. Publication 4 considers the reasoning of the Solicitor General and the 
Human Rights Joint Committee and, following consideration of partially conflicting 
case law, concludes that (as with religion or belief before it) legislation could solve an 
anomalous situation and that the passage of the Equality Act 2010 offered an 
opportunity to do this by simplifying the law through real harmonisation, ‘bringing 
marriage and civil partnership (or even the broader family status) into the fold.  This 
opportunity, spurned by the government and neglected by Parliament, regrettably 
leaves the quest for clarity, in due course, to the higher courts.’37 
 
Publication 5 (on third-party harassment), more tangentially, examines the 
inadequacy of the impact assessment and makes the argument for the removal of the 
provision.  The original third-party harassment provision (rendering employers liable 
for acts of harassment by third parties against their employees) was arguably 
unnecessary.  It was brought in in response to the 2007 judicial review of the Sex 
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Discrimination Act 1975.  However, in the judgment, Burton J thought that changes to 
the general wording of the definition of harassment, moving from a causative to an 
associative approach, would allow third-party claims.38  Nonetheless, a distinct 
provision was included in the changes to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and carried 
across to the Equality Act 2010.  Ahead of the carrying across, the Impact Assessment 
for the Equality Bill presented only three alternatives: maintain the status quo; cover 
all the relevant protected characteristics for employment (which was adopted); and 
extend coverage to the provision of goods and services.  No consideration was given 
to the possibility of a fourth alternative: namely (not least to aid simplification) to 
remove it all together and rely on the underlying law.  The article then sets out how 
the underlying law could provide redress, drawing on government memoranda and 
judicial decisions (see further below). 
 
Examination of the passage of the Bill is necessarily limited in Publication 7 (non-
standard discrimination protection outside the Equality Act).  While it notes in passing 
the late insertion of the caste provision, it focusses on what the Government opted to 
leave out when drafting the Act.  Had further thought been given to the matter of 
political membership then the lacuna identified in the article may not have arisen.  
Publication 7 addresses the protection afforded to membership of political groups, 
among other atypical protections (namely trades union membership/activities, 
whistleblowing and the rehabilitation of offenders), and considers the effect of 
expanding the Equality Act as an alternative to the government’s response to 
Redfearn v UK.  It draws on points made by Collins and Mantouvalou (2013)39 
regarding Redfearn but makes further contribution not only as the piece was written 
following publication of the government’s proposals as to how to address the gap in 
protection identified by the European Court of Human Rights but also through 
identifying greater elements to the lacuna left by the government’s choice (e.g. quasi-
employment and the provision of services are left unprotected following the 
government’s action to provide protection through employment law rather than the 
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Equality Act).40  It also explores other non-standard protections (including the little 
litigated and discussed rehabilitation of offenders provisions). 
 
More explicitly, two sections of Publication 8 (Discrimination Law and the Ebb and 
Flow of Indirect Effect in Britain) specifically cover problems with the Equality Act 
2010: the status of pregnancy/maternity as a protected characteristic and the drafting 
of the victimisation provisions.  Problems in drafting are innately connected to 
questions of parliamentary scrutiny but also provide rich opportunity for judicial 
interpretation and this publication will be considered in more detail in the next 
section.   Publication 9 (Enigmas of the Equality Act – Three Uneasy Pieces) again 
addresses pregnancy/maternity and victimisation as well as gender reassignment but 
with a greater legislative (rather than judicial) focus.  In presenting a selective cross-
section of this pervasive sub-theme, it acts to highlight that the unification and 
purported simplification process has not only failed to address some of the 
inconsistencies and uncertainties in the law but added others.  As the conclusion to 
Publication 9 states ‘[t]he Equality Act 2010 has helped unify the law in the area but as 
things stand the existence of such enigmatic or merely inadequately transposed 
provisions are testament to a failure to make the law more accessible and easier to 
understand for the ordinary user of the Act.’41   
 
It is inevitable that there will in practice be flaws in legislation but the number of flaws 
identified throughout the pieces discussed above in what was intended to be a 
simplifying statute add weight to the argument that it was ill-scrutinised.  
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Scope of Judicial Interpretation 
 
My work can also be seen to critically discuss judicial interpretation and the 
problematic jurisprudence surrounding the interpretation and application of some of 
the significant issues in the legislation.  Discrimination law, particularly but not 
exclusively due to European law (arising from both the Union and the application of 
the Convention), has seen extensive judicial interpretation.  Indeed, as noted in 
Publication 8 ‘a number of the leading cases on indirect effect have concerned 
discrimination law’.42  Accordingly, many of the submitted publications include, to 
varying extents, an examination of judicial interpretation.  This may be while 
explaining the law, critically challenging the law and/or suggesting an alternative 
solution to problems with the law.  Publication 8, given its title ‘Discrimination Law 
and the Ebb and Flow of Indirect Effect in Britain’, clearly makes the prime 
contribution to this sub-theme, supported by Publication 9.  That is not to say the 
others play an insignificant part and publications 2, 4 and 5 will also be considered 
here (Publication 3 touches on areas developed in later publications and Publication 6 
draws on some of those with regard to the seven foundations).  While Publication 8 
looks at the variable scope of indirect effect, and analyses the sometimes extreme 
uses of the doctrine, publications 2, 4 and 5 suggest that interpretation could 
sometimes solve problems better than the attempts at legislation discussed above. 
 
Publication 8 sets out, at some length, the history of indirect effect within the context 
of discrimination law before looking at recent pregnancy/maternity and victimisation 
cases.  The central thesis is that on occasion judicial interpretation has gone beyond 
the sensible reading in of a phrase to allow the purpose of the legislation to be 
respected (as in Litster v Forth Dry Dock)43 or to reflect changing mores (as in Ghaidan 
v Godin-Medoza)44 and on to judicial rewriting with sub-sections impliedly crossed-out 
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and others inserted (as in Attridge Law LLP & Anor v Coleman).45  (It should be noted 
here, as it is in Publication 8, that while Ghaidan is an ECtHR case, there is significant 
cross-over between the interpretative obligation under section 3(1) of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and the doctrine of indirect effect.)46  The article points out that not 
all senior judges appear willing to go so far as in Attridge and that while a degree of 
interpretation is clearly appropriate there comes a time when for the sake of clarity, 
accuracy and legislative and linguistic honesty it would be ‘more comprehensible and 
more comprehensive for compliance to be achieved through legislative action (and 
possibly Commission intervention) than through juridicial contortion.’47 
 
The arguable over-extension of interpretation is not, however, the sole focus of this 
sub-theme.  Publications 2 and 5 concern areas where a restrictive or lack of 
interpretation has led to legislative actions which could have been avoided (and in 
some cases subsequently have been voided) through a more expansive interpretation 
and Publication 4 analyses how wider interpretation could bolster the protected 
characteristic of marriage/civil partnership.  Across all those publications, it should be 
noted that such levels of interpretation stop short of that criticised most particularly 
in Publication 8.   
 
Publication 2 suggests that section 14 of the Equality Act 2010 was a partial and 
redundant provision.  As well as challenging the government’s reasoning regarding the 
limitation of the dual discrimination provision and the time spent on parliamentary 
scrutiny, it challenges the position of intersectional campaigners who contend the 
comparator provisions, which require that there are no material differences in 
circumstances,48 create problems with multiple discrimination.  It concludes by 
holding that ‘with a liberal interpretation--by the judiciary or through the addition of a 
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simple explanatory section (such as that in s.1 of the Compensation Act 2006)--such 
provisions can, as illustrated [in the publication], provide a solution.’49  It points out 
that arguments made in support of the provision – such as that where someone is 
discriminated against because they are male and Muslim the reason (and the 
determinative facts) must be sex and race (and not either one or the other) and 
therefore if there is no distinct dual discrimination provision then there can be no 
claim – ignore the line of authorities50 which hold that discrimination may be found on 
a ground even though it is not the sole ground for the decision.  Indeed, this point was 
even acknowledged in Law Society v Bahl in the EAT (the claim failing for other 
reasons).51  Such an interpretation:  would do far less damage to legal certainty and 
clarity than those criticised most particularly in Publication 8; would have avoided the 
legislative absurdity of recognising the possibility of recognising combined 
discrimination if it was dual and direct but not if more than two characteristics or 
indirect; and would ‘provide a more comprehensive and coherent system’.52   
 
The issue arose again in Publication 5 ‘Employer’s Liability for Third-Party Harassment: 
An ‘Unworkable’ and Superfluous Provision?’.  Rather than introducing third party 
liability in statute with peculiar statutory hurdles, potentially wider protection could 
have been achieved through interpretation of the exiting law.  Indeed, this more 
comprehensible and comprehensive protection was what the judge assumed would 
happen as result of the judicial review which brought about the change in wording.  
The article is cited as authority by Middlemiss & Downie for the statement that ‘some 
commenters believe employees still have protection under the general harassment 
provisions set out in s 26 of the EA 2010’53 as well as by the likes of Cabrelli.54  Barmes 
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must now be added to those who believe that the general provisions provide some 
protection.  Citing the piece in a footnote, she shares the view that it is hard to see 
from the judgment in EOC v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWHC 
483 how it can be said that it, as the explanatory notes contend, required the 
introduction of the provision.55  Furthermore, as the article explains, before the 
government appears to have confused itself, they took the view that protection was 
implicitly already provided.56   The Impact Assessment interpreted the judgment, 
however, as requiring change.57  Through discussing cases such as Norouzi58 the article 
demonstrates that the introduction of the statutory definition of harassment and the 
subsequent adoption of the ‘related to’ rather than ‘ground of’ formulation allows for 
claims arising from third party action where the employer may be at some fault.  As 
Barmes likewise notes, citing this piece, the case ‘confirmed that EU law to some 
extent imposes liability on employers for third party harassment’.59  In that case 
Underhill P could rely directly on the relevant directive,60 but the purposive 
interpretation could have been used on the Race Relations Act 1976 as it did not limit 
protection in the way that the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 did before the 2008 
amendments or the way that the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 did before the 
remarkable interpretation in Attridge Law (considered above in Publication 8).  The 
adoption of wording closer to the directive in the Equality Act 2010 should allow 
claims across the board if the employer contributes (and does not seek to mediate) 
the hostile, degrading, etc. environment. 
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Arguably more radical interpretation may be required to bolster the role of the 
protected characteristic of marriage/civil partnership as considered in Publication 4.  
This publication contrasts two 2011 EAT cases concerning the breadth of the 
protected characteristic - Dunn v The Institute of Cemetery and Crematorium 
Management61 and Hawkins v Atex Group Ltd & Ors62 – and draws on ECHR 
jurisprudence to suggest that the status could conceivably be extended to family 
status more broadly.  Underhill P in Hawkins opted to take a narrow approach to 
interpretation which ‘seems to make the ground so narrow as to be almost 
meaningless’.63  The three member panel in Dunn however opens the door to reading 
in ECHR authorities and expanding the interpretation to include relationship at least, 
rather than simply the fact of marriage (or civil partnership), if not to wider family.  
Given the extensive interpretation elsewhere such a view would be relatively tame. 
 
Judicial interpretation, be it strained or restrained, is the lifeblood of the law in action.  
As the publications show in their discussion of cases and provisions, it can be an 
appropriate means to allow legislation to work more smoothly and to adjust to the 
changing times.  Judicial interpretation could be more effective and provide greater 
coherency than legislative intervention but there are times when legislative 
amendment is – or should be – a more satisfactory and comprehensible answer to a 
problem with the law.   
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Conclusion 
 
This commentary brings together nine papers published over seven years which 
together form a coherent examination of legislative changes to British discrimination 
law ahead of and via the Equality Act 2010.  There is an inherent coherency to the 
submitted publications and the narrative commentary examines them through three 
specific prisms – the contexts of the Equality Act 2010’s predecessor legislation, its 
drafting and passage through Parliament and the scope and deployment of judicial 
interpretation.  All the papers have been accepted for publication in reputable 
journals and individually or collectively have made an original contribution to 
knowledge; make a potential contribution to future policy or support 
contemporaneous policy; and despite being based primarily on British law have some 
international as well as national relevance.   
 
A number of the articles are relatively recent but as noted above and in Appendix 2 
some of the submitted publications have been cited in textbooks and theses and, 
furthermore, some have attracted a reasonably high number of accesses online (with 
a number appearing in monthly or cumulative ‘most read’ lists).  This, together with 
their acceptance for reputable journals, helps testify to their contribution to 
knowledge.  Alongside citations in textbooks, it is clearly apparent from the 
geographical and temporal information available through Academia.edu – as well as 
through online reading lists – that some of the submitted publications have been 
useful to students.  The international reach is again attested to by Acadmia.edu and 
through citations in a German text and a submission by Amnesty International Hong 
Kong to the Hong Kong Discrimination Review.   
 
The papers’ primary contribution to knowledge was to provide an analysis of a 
number of aspects of the Equality Act 2010 which can be viewed through the contexts 
of its predecessor legislation, its drafting and passage through Parliament and the 
scope of judicial interpretation.  Throughout the submitted publications it can be seen 
that the Equality Act 2010 has acted to unify the law (partially), amplify the law 
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(mutedly) and simplify the law (while introducing complexity).  The submitted 
publications provide support for changes to the law and suggest others and in doing 
so it is contended that they display the use of independent critical powers and 
constitute a systematic study of the area which shows that the legislative intent has 
only been partially fulfilled.   
 
While the Act did unify a raft of legislation and harmonised some provisions to 
describe it as a single Equality Act is a misnomer as areas including membership of 
political groups, membership of trade unions and the possession of past convictions 
fall to be protected outside the single Act (which may have significant consequences if 
a Redfearn type situation falls within a quasi-employment or services setting).  The Act 
did more than partially unify and harmonise, there has been significant amplification 
of the scope of positive action and more informal moves with regard to equal pay 
transparency.  While unification may help simplify the law, greater use of algebraic 
definitions and curious placement may serve to hinder the reader.  More problematic 
though are provisions which courts are left to ‘cudgel [their] brains about what real 
effect, if any,’ they may have64 as well as others which introduce complexity where 
none is needed.  Specific examples of this can be seen in the non-implementation of 
the partial and redundant dual discrimination provision and the repeal of the third-
party harassment provision which far from simplifying the law presented an 
unnecessary complication when claims could more simply be brought as a 
consequence of changes to the definition.  As demonstrated, restrained judicial 
interpretation can do justice to both the protection afforded and the language used 
(rather than embarking on the excesses of judicial insertion of sub-sections that seem 
to run contrary to linguistic and legislative propriety) but statutory amendment could 
yet play a role both in declaring how the law be interpreted (for example if a 
declaratory provision was deemed necessary to provide certainty for harassment or 
dual-discrimination, or to widen protection for marriage and civil partnership) and in 
correcting presumed drafting error (such as the enigmas of the status of 
                                                     
64
 Jessemey v Rowstock Ltd & Anor [2014] ICR 550, [49] cited in Publication 9. 
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pregnancy/maternity discrimination and the purpose of section 108(7) following the 
judicial mandating that protection of post-employment victimisation is available).   
 
During the timespan of writing the submitted publications and this commentary, the 
Equality Act 2010 has been passed, positive measures have taken a step forward 
(within a predominantly formal model), the partial combined discrimination provision 
has been rejected and unimplemented, the unnecessarily complex third-party 
harassment provision has been implemented and repealed, the government has 
opted to protect political membership through an employment-only route leaving a 
potential hole in protection and the judiciary has wrestled with interpreting the 
uninterpretable and stretching plain meaning beyond what it may reasonably be said 
to bear.  While equality is a vital topic, it is not proposed that it ranks as a foundation 
of law in a topical sense (but rather that it is connected to all the existing foundations 
and thus may be used to show their worth in exploring further topics).  There remains 
judicial dissent as to how to interpret ‘creating an environment’ with regard to 
harassment and in how broad marriage/civil partnership stretches both of which can 
be resolved through progressive (but comparably restrained) interpretation or 
through minor declaratory legislative amendment.  Legislative intervention would also 
help clarify the ambivalent status of pregnancy/maternity (expressly excluded from 
some areas and potentially implicitly excluded from others) and the enigma of section 
108(7). 
 
In claiming that there is a systematic study presented, it should not be thought that 
there is not more to consider about the Equality Act 2010 as it enters its second half-
decade, which is an area I plan to study further (not least as 20 of the 218 sections 
remain unimplemented to an extent), but rather that the submitted publications not 
only stand on their own but together present a coherent review with both breadth 
and depth of legislative changes to discrimination law ahead of and via the Equality 
Act 2010.   
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1.  Hand, J.  (2008) ‘A Decade of Change in British Discrimination Law: Positive Steps 
Forward?’  34(3) Commonwealth Law Bulletin  595-605  
 
Cited in: 
 Meer, N. (2010) ‘The implications of EC Race Equality and Employment 
Directives for British anti-discrimination legislation’ 38(2) Policy & Politics 197-215;  
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Equality in the Workforce’ 2(1) North East Law Review 137-168 (at 160 and 162). 
 
 
2.  Hand, J.  (2011) ‘Combined Discrimination - section 14 of the Equality Act 2010: a 
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509-528  
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Cited in: 
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5.  Hand, J.  (2013) ‘Employer’s Liability for Third-Party Harassment: An ‘Unworkable’ 
and Superfluous Provision?’ 42(1) Ind Law J 75-84  
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Selective screengrabs follow below which support the above, and references in the 
body of the text, in cases where the information may not be publicly retrievable.  The 
Taylor & Francis access figures can be seen on the journals’ webpages and the 
academia.edu figures can be verified by visiting the site (links to both can be found via 
those in Appendix 1).  A representation of the international use of the papers on 
academia.edu is also provided. 
 
A screengrab of an email from the editor of the Liverpool Law Review confirming 
acceptance of Publication 8 follows at the end of Appendix 2.  
 Publisher’s information Academia.edu 
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some monthly most 
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but appears on some 
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Publication 6 (2015) 370 article views (T&F)    35 (pre-print) 
Publication 7 (2015) Sage do not give cumulative 
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some monthly most 
accessed lists 
 n/a (bibliographic data only)    
           (but 45 downloads   
           from institutional  
           repository) 
Publication 8 (accepted) n/a   n/a (bibliographic data only) 
Publication 9 (Dec 2015) 318 views (T&F OA)   n/a (bibliographic data only) 
Table 1 - figures as at 11/04/16 
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Contribution to Co-Authored Papers 
 
Three of the nine submitted papers were co-authored.  In each case, I was the 
corresponding author, instigator, main writer and editor.  My co-authors’ contribution 
was sufficiently substantial to merit more than a footnoted acknowledgment but they 
would freely agree it was not co-equal: 
 
In Publication 3, Hand, J. , Davis, B. & Feast P.  (2012) ‘Unification, simplification, 
amplification? An analysis of aspects of the British Equality Act 2010’ 38(3) 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin  509-528, Bernard Davis helped recraft the introduction 
and Pat Feast led on the Equal Pay section. 
 
In Publication 6, Hand, J., Davis, B. & Barker, C.  (2015) ‘The British Equality Act 2010 
and the foundations of legal knowledge’ 41(3) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 3–28, 
Bernard Davis and Charles Barker wrote drafts of the Criminal law and Land law 
sections (building on outline notes prepared by me).  I wrote the other five 
substantive sections, the introduction and conclusion and edited the whole piece. 
 
In Publication 9, Feast, P. and Hand, J. (2015) ‘Enigmas of the Equality Act – “Three 
Uneasy Pieces”, Cogent Social Sciences 1: 1123085 (15 Dec 2015), Pat Feast led on the 
gender reassignment section.  I conceived the idea, discussed the section with her in 
advance, edited it afterwards and wrote the other two sections, the introduction and 
conclusion and was the corresponding author.  (An abstract for the piece was 
previously accepted for a conference at which Pat Feast was to present but it had to 
be withdrawn due to ill health but the order of the names was kept for the article.)  
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